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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE EXERCISE OF RE-
LIGION-The United States Supreme Court held that when a law
that is neither neutral nor generally applicable burdens religious
practices that law must be justified by a compelling state interest.
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993).
In April, 1987, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
("Church")1 leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida ("City") for
the purpose of building a church to practice the Santeria religion,2
which included the religious rite of animal sacrifice.3 In response,
the Hialeah City Council ("City Council") met on June 9, 1987,
and adopted a resolution that declared the City's steadfast opposi-
tion to religious practices that were contrary to "public morals,
peace or safety."4 At this meeting, the City Council also adopted
the Florida Animal Cruelty Statute.5 Thereafter, the City Council
passed three ordinances which prohibited the possession of ani-
mals intended to be sacrificed,' the sacrifice of animals within the
1. The Church, organized and existing under Florida law since 1973, is a non-profit
corporation. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2223
(1993).
2. The Santeria religion, also known as Yoba or Yoruba, has been practiced for
nearly 4000 years, beginning in West Africa; it was brought to Cuba by slaves and later
brought to the United States by Cuban exiles. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469-70 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
3. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223.
4. Id. The resolution provided, in part, "The city reiterates its commitment to a
prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety." Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2234-35 (quoting Hialeah, Fla.,
Resolution No. 87-66 (1987)).
5. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223. The Florida animal cruelty statute provides:
Whoever unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, tortures, torments, deprives of neces-
sary sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily or cruelly beats, mutilates or kills any
animal, or causes the same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle , or otherwise,
any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree.
FLA. STAT. ch. 828.12 (1982).
The attorney general for the state of Florida,-in an opinion letter, indicated that an unnec-
essary killing under the Florida animal cruelty statute would include an animal sacrifice if
the sacrifice was part of a ritual and not undertaken primarily for the purpose of food con-
sumption. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223 (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 2224. Ordinance 87-52 provides, in part:
Sacrifice-to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or
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city limits, 7 and the slaughter of animals in an area not zoned for
slaughterhouses.'
The Church and Ernesto Pichardo9 ("Plaintiffs") brought an ac-,
tion in the United States District Court of the Southern District of
Florida, contending that the ordinances violated the First Amend-
ment," and seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and
money damages.11 After a non-jury trial, the district court held
that the ordinances did not violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment
rights, and ruled in favor of the City. 2 The district court found
that the ordinances regulated conduct, not belief, and that they
served a secular purpose and had a secular effect.' s Because the
ordinances survived these threshold tests, the court then balanced
the competing interests of the City in maintaining the ordinances
and those of the Church in continuing the religious practice of
animal sacrifice.
14
The court acknowledged that the ordinances imposed a burden
on the religious acts of the Church, but found that the City had
compelling interests in maintaining public health,' 5 protecting the
welfare of children, 6 preventing cruelty to animals, 7 and restrict-
private ritual or ceremony nor for the primary purpose of food consumption . . .
Slaughter-the killing of animals for food . . . No person shall . . . possess . . . any
• . . animal, intending to use such animal for food purposes . . . . This section is
applicable to any group or individual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for
any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to
be consumed . . . . Nothing in this ordinance is to be interpreted as prohibiting any
licensed establishment from slaughtering for food purposes any animals which are
specifically raised for food purposes where such activity is properly zoned and/or per-
mitted under state and local law.
Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting HIALEAH, FLA; ORDINANCE 87-52 (1987)).
7. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2224 (citing HIALEAH, FLA; ORDINANCE 87-71 (1987)).
8. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2224 (citing HIALEAH, FLA; ORDINANCE 87-72 (1987)).
9. Pichardo held the title of Italero and was the Church's leader. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct.
at 2223.
10. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peace-
able to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
11. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2224.
12. Id.
13. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1483.
14. Id. at 1484.
15. Id. at 1485. The district court found a danger to the Church members from the
risk of sacrifice and consumption of diseased animals, and a risk to the general public from
the improper disposal of animal carcasses. Id.
16. Id. The court found persuasive the testimony that children who witnessed animal
sacrifice were likely to be affected psychologically. Id. at 1486.
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ing animal slaughter to areas zoned for that purpose.18 The district
court held that the City's compelling interests outweighed the bur-
den imposed upon the Church and, therefore, the ordinances did
not violate the First Amendment. 9 Further, the court held that
the Church was not entitled to an exemption from compliance with
the animal sacrifice ordinances because such an exemption would
defeat the City's compelling interests in enacting the ordinances.2
Plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the district court holding that the
ordinances did not violate the United States Constitution." In re-
viewing the district court's opinion, the circuit court did not apply
the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.22 Rather, the circuit court held that the standard
used by the district court in upholding the ordinances was stricter
than the Smith standaid and, therefore, it was unnecessary to con-
sider Smith.23 The Church appealed and the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.
24
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and de-
clared unconstitutional the challenged ordinances. 2s The Court be-
gan its analysis by noting that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment was applicable to the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Court asserted that religious prac-
17. Id. The district court concluded, based on an expert's testimony, that the animals
were kept in poor conditions and killed in an unreliable method, and that the ritual sacrifice
was cruel. Id.
18. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1486.
19. Id. at 1487.
20. Id.
21. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir.
1991) (per curiam), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
22: 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith held that a neutral and generally applicable criminal
law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if it burdened religious practices. Smith,
494 U.S. at 885. However, the Court noted that a prohibition applicable only to religious
practices would violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 877. See notes 161-175 and accompa-
nying text.
23. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2225. In affirming the district court's decision, the circuit
court did not rely on the court's finding of a compelling state interest in protecting the
welfare of children. Id.
24. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
25. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, was joined
by Justice Stevens (as to the entire opinion), and Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas (as to the entire opinion except the section that discussed the
intent of the City in enacting the ordinances). Id.
26. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2225. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
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tices are protected under the First Amendment, even if those prac-
tices are abhorrent or incomprehensible to others. 7
In determining whether the ordinances violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment, the Court used the standard
set forth in Smith." ' Under this test, the Court looked first to
whether the ordinances were neutral and of general applicability. 9
The City argued that the language of the ordinances demonstrated
that they were neutral, but the Court found that the use of the
words "sacrifice" and "ritual" suggested the possibility of unconsti-
tutional infringement on religious practices.30 The Court then
looked beyond the text of the ordinances and determined that the
effect of the ordinances as to religious practices was not neutral."'
The Court found that the ordinances were designed to achieve a
"religious gerrymander."32 Finally, the Court found persuasive the
fact that the ordinances were broader than needed to protect the
proffered governmental interests.
3
The Court then determined that the ordinances were not gener-
ally applicable. 34 The Court found that because numerous excep-
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2225 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981)).'
28. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
29. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
30. Id. at 2227. The Court noted that while these words did have a secular meaning,
the religious origins of these words supported the proposition that the ordinances were en-
acted to target religious practices. Id.
31. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2228. The Court noted that the definition of unnecessary
killing excluded virtually every killing of animals that did not take place as part of a reli-
gious sacrifice. Id. In addition, certain religious practices, such as Kosher slaughter, were
recognized as exempt. Id.
32. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). In the political arena, a gerrymander is a geographical division of a
state into voting districts to achieve an unlawful purpose. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (6th
ed. 1990). The Court drew a parallel, opining that the ordinances were designed to target
Santeria religious practices, and not any legitimate governmental interest. Lukumi, 113 S.
Ct. at 2228.
33. Id. at 2229. The Court reasoned that the public health could be protected by
regulations relating to disposal, and that regulating conditions in which animals were kept
and methods of slaughter would serve the City's interest in the prevention of cruelty. Id. at
2229-30.
34. Id. at 2232.
Recent Decisions
tions were carved out of the ordinances, the ordinances were un-
derinclusive for achieving the purported aims of protecting public
health and preventing animal cruelty.
35
Citing McDaniel v. Paty,38 the Court noted that legislation that
targeted religious beliefs was unconstitutional.3 7 The Court then
commented that a law targeting religious practices must be justi-
fied by a compelling state interest. 8 In holding that the ordinances
in question could not satisfy this test, the Court focused on the
City's failure to narrowly tailor the ordinances.39 The City's argu-
ment that the ordinances advanced a compelling interest was re-
jected by the Court because the ordinances failed to regulate secu-
lar conduct producing the same type of harm. 0
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia explained that the terms
"neutral" and "generally applicable" were developed by the Court
to test the constitutionality of statutes challenged under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."' He asserted that if a
law was neutral and generally applicable, it would not be unconsti-
tutional, even if the law affected religiously motivated activities. 2
Further, Justice Scalia noted that while the requirements of neu-
trality and general applicability often overlapped, the neutrality
prong of the test was used to adjudge the language of the statute
and general applicability looked to whether the statute had a dis-
criminatory effect.4 3
In a separate concurrence, Justice Souter agreed with the major-
ity's holding that the challenged ordinances targeted religious
35. Id. With respect to the City's interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the Court
found statutory exceptions for hunting, fishing, medical experimentation, killing of stray
and abandoned animals, and using poison on private property. Id. In regard to the City's
concern for public health, the Court found that the disposal of carcasses by hunters and
restaurants was unregulated; nor were there regulations directed at hunters regarding con-
sumption of uninspected meat. Id. at 2233.
36. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In McDaniel, a provision of the Tennessee Constitution that
prohibited ministers from participating in the state constitutional convention as delegates
was held to violate the Free Exercise Clause because it was not justified by a compelling
state interest. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 629. See notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
37. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S at 626).
38. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227.
39. Id. at 2234 (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232
(1987)).
40. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2234.
41. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined
in Justice Scalia's concurrence. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. In Justice Scalia's opinion, a law that failed one part of the test was likely to
fail the other as well. Id.
1994
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practices and were therefore unconstitutional." However, Justice
Souter disagreed with the Court's application of the rule set forth
in Smith, and argued that this rule ought to be reconsidered in a
case involving a neutral and generally applicable law.
45
Relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder," Justice Souter asserted that
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required govern-
mental neutrality.4 7 However, Justice Souter argued, the neutrality
standard enunciated in Smith required only formal neutrality,
whereas prior decisions by the Court, such as Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization 4 mandated substantive neu-
trality.49 Finally, Souter noted that because the standards set forth
in Smith conflicted with the Court's earlier Free Exercise Clause
decisions without overruling those decisions, the Court should re-
consider the Smith test in a future case, although a reconsideration
of Smith was not necessary to the outcome of the present case.50
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in which he, like
Justice Souter, urged the Court to reconsider its holding in
Smith.51 In Justice Blackmun's view, the fact that the ordinances
in question targeted religious practices necessarily led to the con-
clusion that such ordinances would not satisfy the compelling in-
terest test.52 Blackmun suggested that the decision would have
been more difficult if the Church had been seeking an exemption
from a neutral, generally applicable law that prohibited cruelty to
animals.5
3
44. Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
45. Id. In Justice Souter's opinion, the Smith test was inapplicable in Lukumi be-
cause the ordinances discriminated against religious conduct, and on that basis were uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 2243.
46. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held unconstitutional a Wisconsin stat-
ute mandating attendance at school until age sixteen, as applied to the Amish whose reli-
gious principles opposed public education past the eighth grade. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. See
notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
47. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
48. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). The Swaggart Court upheld a state sales tax as applied to
the sale of religious materials. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 392. The Court noted that the tax was
neutral in its application and did not substantially burden religious practice. Id. at 396. See
notes 152-160 and accompanying text.
49. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Souter, J., concurring). Substantive neutrality
looks to the effect of the law on religious practices and requires a compelling interest to
justify a substantial burden. Id. Formal neutrality, by contrast, is satisfied so long as the
object of the law was not to prohibit religious practices. Id.
50. Id. at 2250.
51. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion was joined by Justice O'Connor. Id.
52. Id. at 2251.
53. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's unanimous ruling in this case should
Vol. 32:915
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The Supreme Court first considered whether the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment permitted a challenge to the con-
stitutionality of a statute that burdened religious conduct over 100
years ago in Reynolds v. United States.5 4 In Reynolds, the defend-
ant had been convicted of violating a statute that prohibited big-
amy in the Territory of Utah, and he asserted his religious beliefs
as a defense.55 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause pro-
hibited the regulation of religious belief, but was not applicable to
conduct.5 6 The Court determined that the statute in question regu-
lated conduct and was therefore constitutional." Further, the
Court refused to grant an exemption to the defendant from com-
pliance with the statute, asserting that an exemption would render
religious doctrine superior to law. 58
This holding was reaffirmed in Davis v. Beason.5e At issue in Da-
vis was the constitutionality of a statute that disqualified
polygamists, and members of organizations that advocated polyg-
amy, from voting. 0 Petitioner, a Mormon, was indicted for violat-
ing the statute.6 " The Court held that the protection afforded
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment extended
only to beliefs, and not to actions otherwise prohibited by law.
62
Because polygamy was prohibited by law, the Court ruled that the
statute did not violate the Constitution.6
not be viewed as indicative of the weight the Court would give to a state interest in prevent-
ing animal cruelty through a neutral and generally applicable state law. Id.
54. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
55. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146, 150. The defendant was a member of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("Mormon"), and believed his religious duty compelled
polygamy. Id. He requested the jury be instructed that if, in its judgment, his marriage was
founded on his religious beliefs, then he must be acquitted. Id. at 161-62.
56. Id. at 166.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 167.
59. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
60. Davis, 133 U.S. at 346-47. The statute also disqualified insane people, convicted
felons, traitors and extortionists. Id. at 346.
61. Id. at 334. Prior to voting in the Territory of Idaho, the petitioner took an oath,
as required by the statute, which included a statement that he was not a member of an
organization promoting polygamy. Id. at 334. After the petitioner's membership in the Mor-
mon church was discovered, he was indicted for conspiring to subvert the laws of Idaho. Id.
at 334-35.
62. Id. at 342. This limitation was proper in the Court's view because religious free-
doms were included in the First Amendment to prevent government from compelling partic-
ular religious beliefs. Id.
63. Id. at 342. The Court's position was quite adamant as evidenced by the following
passage:
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been seriously contended
1994
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The Supreme Court first recognized that conduct could be pro-
tected under the Free Exercise Clause some fifty years later with
its decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut.4 In Cantwell, the defend-
ant had been convicted of violating a state statute requiring reli-
gious or charitable solicitors to obtain a license from the secretary
of the public welfare council prior to solicitation. 5 The statute au-
thorized the secretary to issue the license only after determining
that the solicitor was acting on behalf of a legitimate religious
cause. 6 The state contended that the statute was enacted to ad-
vance the state's interest in preventing fraud. 7 The issue before
the Court was whether the statute unconstitutionally infringed
upon the defendant's free exercise of religion."'
The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment' protected conduct attributable to religious beliefs. 0
However, the Court stated that because the state could regulate
conduct, the statute must be examined to determine whether it un-
duly infringed upon the free exercise of religion.7 1 The statute was
declared unconstitutional because the Court determined that the
that the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the general
consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory
legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging
crime may be carried out without hindrance.
Id. at 343.
64. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
65. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02. The statute provided:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any
alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the
organization for whose benefit such person or organization is located unless such
cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council. Upon
application of any person in behalf of such cause, the secretary shall determine
whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity or philan-
thropy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity, and, if he
shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the authority in charge a certificate
to that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time. Any person violating any
provision of this section shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or impris-
oned not more than thirty days or both.
Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6294 (1937)).
66. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305. The Court noted that the secretary's determination
was necessarily based on his own judgment as to what constituted a religious cause. Id.
67. Id. at 302.
68. Id. at 304-05.
69. According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of due process
of law prohibited the states from violating the fundamental rights contained in the First
Amendment, including the rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 303.
70. Id. at 303. The Court indicated that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment protected belief, while the Free Exercise Clause protected conduct. Id.
71. CantweU, 310 U.S. at 304.
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state interest in preventing fraud did not justify the burden placed
on the free exercise of religion.72
Shortly after Cantwell, the Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to a statute that burdened religious conduct as well as belief.
In West Virginia v. Barnette,3 the state board of education had
adopted a resolution that required all students and teachers to
participate in a salute to the flag of the United States.7 ' The appel-
lees objected to the flag salute on religious grounds.7 5 For refusing
to participate in the flag salute, the children were expelled from
school and their parents were charged with allowing their children
to be delinquent.7 6 The Court addressed the issue of whether the
state could constitutionally require a salute to the flag.77 The Court
held that the freedoms set forth in the First Amendment, includ-
ing the freedom of religion, could only be restricted to protect a
lawful state interest that was threatened by grave danger.7 a The
Court concluded that the state's interest in national unity did not
justify the infringement on First Amendment freedoms created by
the compulsory flag salute.79
The Cantwell Court's test of the validity of a statute burdening
the free exercise of religion was applied to a license tax in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania." In Murdock, a city ordinance required all solici-
tors and canvassers to pay for a license prior to undertaking any
activity in the city." Petitioners were convicted of soliciting with-
out a license, and challenged their convictions, arguing that the or-
dinance interfered with their freedom of religion.2
The Court addressed the issue of whether the collection of a li-
72. Id. at 305. In particular, the Court objected to the secretary adjudging the legiti-
macy of religious causes. Id. The Court opined that if the regulation had applied to all
solicitors and had not included a test based on religion, it would have been enforceable. Id.
73. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
74. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626.
75. Id. at 629. The appellees were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the
flag was bowing to an image, which was forbidden by their religion. Id.
76. Id. at 630.
77. Id. at 636.
78. Id. at 639. The Court noted that the state did not assert that refusal to salute the
flag created a danger to the state's interests. Id. at 634.
79. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
80. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
81. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106. The fee for the license tax was one dollar fifty cents
per day, or seven dollars per week. Id.
82. Id. at 106-07. The petitioners, Jehovah's Witnesses, contended that it was their
religious obligation to go from door to door distributing religious literature. Id. at 108. The




cense tax from religious canvassers violated the canvassers' free-
dom of religion. 3 The Court first determined that the analysis did
not depend on whether the petitioners were selling the religious
materials or giving the materials to people in exchange for a dona-
tion."' The Court then noted that the ability to tax a privilege was
tantamount to the ability to control that privilege. 6 Because free-
dom of religion is a protected privilege under the First Amend-
ment, the Court held that the exercise of that privilege could not
be taxed by the state.86 Further, the Court held that the ordinance
was not narrowly tailored to advance the purported governmental
interest in protecting against the potential abuses of solicitation. 7
The next year, the Court's view of the scope of religious conduct
protected under the First Amendment was revealed in its decision
in Prince v. Massachusetts."8 The defendant in Prince was con-
victed of violating a state statute prohibiting child labor, for per-
mitting a nine-year old girl to sell merchandise on a public street.8 9
The merchandise the child sold was religious pamphlets.9 0
The Court considered the issue of whether a law prohibiting
children from selling merchandise on a public street was constitu-
tional when applied to prohibit religiously motivated activity.'
The Court asserted that the state had a valid interest in providing
83. Id. at 110.
84. Id. at 111. The Court observed that while there was not a bright line to distin-
guish commercial activity from religious activity, all religious organizations required funds,
and this need alone did not render the religious activities commercial enterprises. Id.
85. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112.
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id. at 116. In this regard, the Court noted that the licensing tax was not designed
to defray the city's expenses related to solicitation, nor was it intended simply to register
and identify solicitors. Id.
The next term, in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Court held that
the application of a flat license tax, similar to the tax in Murdock, to one who earned his
living selling religious books was unconstitutional. Follett, 321 U.S. at 576-77.
88. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
89. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159-160. The defendant was the aunt and legal guardian of
the girl. Id. at 159. The child labor statute provided, "No boy under twelve and no girl
under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or
any other articles of merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or
scavenger, or any other trade, in any street or public place." Id. at 160-61 (quoting MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 149, § 69 (1939)).
90. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161. The child, a Jehovah's Witness, believed her salvation
was dependent upon the performance of this work. Id. at 163.
91. Id. The Court noted that the question of whether the child's conduct constituted
selling within the meaning of the statute had been answered in the affirmative by the state
supreme court and, therefore, was no longer at issue. Id.
Vol. 32:915
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for the welfare of children." ' Further, the Court recognized the de-
fendant's right to freely exercise her religion, but indicated that
the right was subject to regulation.9" Therefore, the Court held, the
interests of those engaging in the conduct must be balanced
against the interests of the state."' The Court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting children prevailed in this case.96
In Fowler v. Rhode Island,9" the Supreme Court addressed for
the first time in the context of religious freedom whether a law
neutral on its face could nevertheless be discriminatory in applica-
tion and, therefore, unconstitutional. " Defendant was convicted of
violating a city ordinance that prohibited political or religious ad-
dresses in any city park. 98 The ordinance in question was not em-
ployed to preclude church services, nor sermons at those services,
from being conducted in the park.99 Focusing on the distinct treat-
ment accorded different religions under the ordinance, the Court
ruled that because the ordinance was employed to prevent reli-
gious practices of some groups, but not similar practices of others,
the ordinance was unconstitutional.
00
In Braunfeld v. Brown,1'0 the Supreme Court demonstrated the
limits of the holding in Fowler. The Court in this case addressed
the issue of whether a law requiring all businesses to remain closed
on Sunday, as applied to those observing a Saturday Sabbath, vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause.'02 Appellants were store owners
92. Id. at 165.
93. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id. at 168. T he Court asserted that the state had more power to regulate matters
involving children than those involving only adults. Id. The Court opined that if the ordi-
nance had prevented adults from selling merchandise on public streets it would not have
survived a similar constitutional challenge. Id. at 167.
96. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
97. Fowler, 345 U.S. at 69.
98. Id. at 68. The ordinance provided:
No person shall address any political or religious meeting in any public park; but this
section shall not be construed to prohibit any political or religious club or society
from visiting any public park in a body, provided that no public address shall be
made under the auspices of such club or society in such park.
Id. at 67 (quoting PAWTUCKET, R.I. ORDINANCE). The.defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, had
addressed a gathering of Jehovah's Witnesses in the park. Id. at 68.
99. Id. at 69. This point was admitted by the state at oral argument before the Court.
Id. The trial court found that the defendant's address took place at a religious meeting. Id.
100. Id. The Court held that the state was not constitutionally entitled to draw a dis-
tinction between a sermon and an address as a means to regulate the conduct of some reli-
gious groups. Id. at 70.
101. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
102. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
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whose observance of a Saturday Sabbath required them to close
their stores from Friday night to Saturday night.103 They argued
that they were entitled to an exemption from the Sunday closing
law because the law interfered with the free exercise of their reli-
gion by virtue of an economic burden. 104
The Court first noted that the statute economically burdened all
those who would otherwise work on Sunday. 105 The Court then
pointed out that the statute did not criminalize any religious con-
duct.106 Therefore, the Court concluded that the statute regulated
a secular activity and placed only an indirect burden on religious
practices.0 7
The Court held that a generally applicable law that imposed an
indirect burden on religion was constitutional unless the state
could achieve its goals through a law imposing no burden on the
practice of religion. °'0 Because the economic effect of the legisla-
tion was deemed an indirect burden, the Court upheld the stat-
ute.109 Finally, the Court refused to grant the appellants an exemp-
tion from the statute, holding that such an exemption might
undermine the state's interest in providing a day of rest."10
While the Court in Braunfeld looked to the nature of the burden
the statute imposed on religious conduct, in Torcaso v. Watkins'
the Court set forth a different standard for laws that burden reli-
gious belief. In Torcaso, the appellant was denied a commission as
a Notary Public because he refused to assert that he believed in
God, as required by the Maryland Constitution." 2 , This require-
103. Id. Appellants, Orthodox Jews, were required by their religion to refrain from all
work and close their businesses during the Sabbath. Id.
104. Id. at 601-02. One of the appellants asserted that the economic loss would force
him to close his business if he were subject to the statute. Id. at 601.
105. Id. at 603.
106. Id. at 605. The Court noted that the statute would render appellants' practice of
their religion more expensive. Id.
107. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
108. Id. at 607.
109. Id. at 606. In addition, the Court found the state's interest in providing a day of
rest could not be satisfied in any other manner. Id. at 607.
110. Id. at 608. Further, the Court noted an exemption might create enforcement
problems and other difficulties, as those entitled to keep their businesses open on Sunday
would have a significant economic advantage over the majority of businesses that were
closed on Sunday. Id. at 608-09. The dissent asserted that the state interest must be com-
pelling in order to justify a burden on religious practices. Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The state's interest in providing a day of rest, without exception, did not, the dissent
contended, constitute a compelling state interest. Id. at 614.
111. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
112. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489. The constitutional provision in question, Article 37 of
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ment, the Court asserted, placed a burden on the appellant's reli-
gious beliefs.11 3 The Court held that any law requiring a declara-
tion of belief in any religious principle was unconstitutional.1 "" The
Court concluded that the provision of the Maryland Constitution
requiring a declaration of belief in God violated the appellant's
freedom of religion and was therefore unconstitutional.115
The Supreme Court's first significant expansion of the protec-
tion afforded religiously motivated conduct occurred in 1963 in the
Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner."' The appellant in Sher-
bert had been fired because she refused to work on Saturday, her
religion's Sabbath.1 ' Appellant filed for unemployment compensa-
tion when she was unable to find work. 1 8 She was denied benefits
for failing to accept work without good cause. 9
The Court addressed the issue of whether the denial of benefits
to the appellant under the statute violated appellant's right of free
exercise of religion. 20 In reviewing prior decisions that implicated
the Free Exercise Clause, the Court noted that while religiously
motivated activity was subject to regulation, the conduct that had
been regulated was conduct that threatened public safety or
peace. ' The Court noted that appellant's conduct, refusing to
work on her religion's Sabbath, was not conduct that threatened
public safety or peace, and was not subject to regulation on that
basis. '2 Therefore, the Court held that appellant's conduct could
only be regulated if the regulation did not interfere with the free
the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution, provided in part, "[n]o religious
test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State,
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God .... " MD. CONST. art. 37.
113. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 496. The Court rejected the state supreme court's view that
the state constitutional provision did not compel religious belief because the appellant was
not required to become a Notary Public. Id. at 495.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 496.
116. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. When appellant was originally hired, her employer did
not require Saturday work. Id. at 399 n.1. The Court noted that her religion, Seventh-Day
Adventism, clearly prohibited working on Saturday, and further noted that whether she
sincerely held these religious beliefs was not at issue. Id.
118. Id. at 399-400.
119. Id. at 401. The state supreme court rejected the appellant's argument that the
denial of benefits interfered with the free exercise of her religion, holding that the statute in
question did not restrict the appellant from exercising and observing her religious beliefs.
Id.
120. Id. at 403.
121. Id.
122. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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exercise of her religion, or if the regulation advanced a compelling
state interest.
1 23
The Court observed that in determining whether the statute in-
terfered with the free exercise of religion, the purpose as well as
the effect of the statute must be examined. 12' Because the statute
in essence required the appellant to choose between receiving un-
employment benefits and maintaining her religious convictions, the
Court concluded that the statute burdened the free exercise of ap-
pellant's religion.' 2' The Court then determined that the state's in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of the unemployment fund and
guarding against fraudulent claims did not constitute a compelling
state interest. 26 The Court distinguished Braunfeld v. Brown 2 by
asserting that in Braunfeld the state had a substantial interest in
providing a day of rest, and that interest could not be achieved
without burdening the free exercise of religion.1 28 The Court con-
cluded that the state's qualifications for unemployment benefits
were unconstitutional when applied so as to deny benefits to an
individual whose inability to work was grounded on religious
reasons.1 29
123. Id.
124. Id. at 404 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
125. Id. The Court noted that this choice was tantamount to fining the appellant for
observing a Saturday Sabbath. Id. Further, the Court observed that the state statute pre-
cluded an employer from requiring an employee to work on Sunday, if the employee's re-
fusal to work was grounded on reasons of conscience. Id. at 406.
126. Id. at 405. In order for the possibility of fraudulent claims bringing financial ruin
on the unemployment fund to constitute a compelling state interest, the Court held that the
state would be required to demonstrate that there was no means to guard against this possi-
bility without burdening the free exercise of religion. Id. at 407.
127. See notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
128. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408. Justice Brennan, who wrote for the dissent in Braun-
feld, wrote the majority opinion in Sherbert.
129. Id. at 410. The Court's holding in Sherbert was applied in other cases challenging
the denial of benefits under the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the employee was denied benefits for refusing to be transferred to
a plant that made parts for military tanks. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710. He believed making
weapons was contrary to his religion. Id. at 711. The referee denied the application for un-
employment benefits and the state supreme court held that the employee's refusal to work
did not constitute good cause. Id. at 712. The Supreme Court found no compelling state
interest in excluding religious reasons from good cause and reversed. Id. at 719.
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), an employee became
a Seventh Day Adventist and told her employer that she could not continue to work on
Saturday, now her Sabbath. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 138. The Supreme Court again held that
the denial of benefits was not justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 141.
In Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989), an employee who
refused to work on Sunday for religious reasons apart from the doctrine of any organized
religion was denied benefits. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 830. The Court indicated that its previous
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The test developed in Sherbert was also employed by the Su-
preme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder.1 30 In Yoder, the Court ad-
dressed the state's ability to require school attendance until the
age of sixteen in the face of a free exercise challenge by practition-
ers of the Amish religion who believed their children should not
attend public schools past the eighth grade.1 31 As in Sherbert, the
Court first noted that the Wisconsin statute would survive the
challenge only by demonstrating either that the statute did not
burden the free exercise of religion or that the burden was justified
by a compelling state interest. 32 In deciding whether the statute
burdened the free exercise of religion, the Court indicated that fa-
cial neutrality was insufficient.1 33 The Court determined that the
application of the statute to the respondents did burden the free
exercise of religion. 
1 3
The Court then addressed the issue of whether the state's inter-
est in compulsory secondary education was compelling.1 3 5 The
Court asserted that this issue required an examination of the inter-
ests advanced by the state, and a determination of whether those
interests would be undermined by granting an exemption to the
respondents.1 3 Because respondents provided an alternative train-
ing to their children, the Court concluded that the state's interests
in one or two more years of compulsory education were not com-
pelling.13 7 Therefore, the Court held that the statute mandating
school attendance until the age of sixteen as applied to respon-
decisions in this area were not based on the employee's conformity to the principles of an
organized religion, but rather on the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs. Id.
130. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
131. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. The statute in question imposed criminal penalties on
parents who failed to send their children to school each year until the children reached the
age of sixteen. Id.
132. Id. at 214.
133. Id. at 220.
134. Id. at 219. In making this determination, the Court first noted that if the opposi-
tion to secondary public education was based on lifestyle differences rather than religious
grounds, the Free Exercise Clause would be inapplicable. Id. at 216. The Court found that
secondary public education was inconsistent with the Amish faith because it impeded the
child's growth in that religion. Id. at 218. Further, the Court held that the imposition of
criminal penalties for violating the statute constituted a burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. Id.
135. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
136. Id. The state asserted two interests in maintaining compulsory secondary educa-
tion: preparing citizens to take part in the political process and fostering self-reliance. Id.
137. Id. at 225. The Court emphasized the vocational training provided by the Amish
and the fact that the Amish accepted compulsory education through the eighth grade when
noting that the state had not demonstrated how the granting of an exemption under these
circumstances would contravene the state's interest in compulsory education. Id. at 235-36.
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dents, who objected to public education past the eighth grade for
religious reasons, was unconstitutional.13 8
The analysis set forth in Sherbert was also employed to resolve a
free exercise challenge to a state statute that precluded ministers
from being delegates to a state constitutional convention in Mc-
Daniel v. Paty.3 9 The Court first examined whether the statute
burdened the free exercise of religion.140 In holding that the statute
did impose such a burden, the Court observed that in order for the
minister to practice his religion, he would be required to forego his
right to seek legislative office, and in order to seek office, he must
surrender his religious practices.' 4' The Court then addressed the
issue of whether the burden imposed on religion was justified by a
compelling state interest. 42 The Court concluded that the prohibi-
tion did not advance the state's interest in preventing the estab-
lishment of religion, and therefore could not be considered an in-
terest that would justify a burden on religious practices.'4 3
The use of the analysis outlined in Sherbert did not always re-
sult in a determination that the challenged statute violated the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. For example, in
United States v. Lee," the Supreme Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to the payment of social security taxes on religious
grounds. 145 The appellee in this case, a member of the Amish reli-
gion, employed several other Amish, but refused to pay social se-
curity tax and to withhold the employee's share of the tax.14" The
138. Id. at 234. Dissenting in part, Justice Douglas urged that the religious views of
the children in this case were critical to the determination of whether the right to free exer-
cise of religion had been infringed. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He therefore only
joined the majority as to those parents whose children had testified at trial that their own
religious beliefs opposed public education past the eighth grade. Id. at 243.
139. 435 U.S. 618, 620 (1978). The Tennessee Constitution excluded ministers and
priests from the state legislature. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621. The state later enacted a stat-
ute that required a candidate be eligible for service in the state legislature in order to qual-
ify as a delegate to the state constitutional convention. Id.
140. Id. at 626. The Court first indicated that the statute in question purported to
regulate conduct and not belief, because the disqualification was based on status as a minis-
ter. Id. at 627. The Court further indicated that because statutes regulating belief were per
se in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, courts should be wary of determining that a
statute regulated belief. Id. at 627 n.7.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 628.
143. Id. The Court indicated that there was simply no basis in experience for believing
that ministers in public office would seek to advance the interests of their religion in contra-
vention of the duties of their office. Id. at 628-29.
144. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).




Court first noted that the payment of social security taxes, in light
of the appellee's religious beliefs, constituted a burden on appel-
lee's religion.14 7 Thereafter, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the burden on appellee's religious practices was justified
by a compelling interest. '4  The Court determined that the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining the integrity and solvency of the so-
cial security system was a compelling interest. 149  Further, the
Court determined that granting an exemption to the appellee
would undermine the government's compelling interest. 5 ' There-
fore, the Court concluded that the burden imposed on religion was
justified by a compelling governmental interest, and the social se-
curity tax, as applied to appellee, did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.'
The Court has also upheld statutes under the Sherbert analysis
by finding that the laws did not burden the free exercise of reli-
gion. For example, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization,' a state sales tax was applied to all retailers within
the state.' 53 The appellant, a religious, nonprofit corporation, failed
to pay the tax on its sales of merchandise within the state.' The
appellant objected to the tax, claiming that the tax interfered with
the appellant's free exercise of religion.'5 5 The Court considered
whether the application of the tax to a religious organization for
the sale of religious merchandise imposed a burden on the free ex-
ercise of religion.' 9 The Court found that collecting and paying
147. Id. at 257. The Amish religion imposed an obligation upon its members to pro-
vide for the welfare of each other. Id. While the Government argued that this religious doc-
trine did not conflict with the payment of social security tax, the Court noted that it was not
the function of courts to determine the dictates of religion. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 258-59. The Court noted that the success of the social security system was
largely dependent upon mandatory participation. Id. at 258.
150. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. The Court opined that the similarities between the social
security system and the income tax system would lead to numerous claims of exemption
from taxes by religious believers if an exemption were allowed in the instant case. Id.
151. Id. at 261.
152. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
153. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 381. The only exception permitted for religious groups was
an exemption for religious organizations that served meals. Id.
154. Id. at 381-82. The state reviewed the corporation's records and determined that
the corporation owed over $166,000 in taxes, interest and penalties for sales from 1974
through 1981. Id. at 383. The appellant did not object to that part of the tax that repre-
sented the sale of nonreligious articles. Id.
155. Id. The appellant also argued that the tax violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment by entangling government and religion. Id. at 392. The Court rejected
this argument. Id. at 397.
156. Id. at 388.
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the tax did not violate the appellant's religious beliefs. 57 Further,
the Court indicated that the costs of administering the collection
of the tax and any lost sales due to the tax were not "constitution-
ally significant" burdens on the free exercise of religion. 58 Because
the Court determined that the tax did not impose a burden on ap-
pellant's religious practices, the Court held that the tax did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause. 15 9 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, the appellant was not constitutionally entitled to an ex-
emption from the payment of the state sales tax.'6 0
From Sherbert to Swaggart, the Supreme Court had consistently
applied the same framework for analyzing Free Exercise Clause
cases. More than twenty-five years after Sherbert, the Supreme
Court abandoned this, analysis in Employment Division v.
Smith.'6 ' In Smith, two employees were fired after acknowledging
that they had taken peyote as part of a religious rite.'2 The em-
ployees' claims for unemployment benefits were denied because
state law considered peyote use to be criminal, and therefore, the
terminations were based on misconduct.6 3 The Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether the statute criminalizing the use of
peyote, as applied to the respondents' religious practice, violated
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.'
The Court first asserted that prior decisions involving free exer-
cise challenges to denial of unemployment benefits were inapplica-
ble to this case because the prior decisions did not involve conduct
that was illegal.'65 The Court then asserted that it had never ex-
157. Id. at 391.
158. Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 391. The Court did note that if the tax rate was substan-
tially increased so that it prevented appellant's religious practices, then the tax could consti-
tute a burden on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 392.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
162. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The employees were members of the Native American
Church, and had used peyote as part of a ceremony there. Id. This case had been before the
Supreme Court previously. In Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), [hereinafter
Smith I] the Court remanded the case to the state supreme court for a determination of
whether the use of peyote was criminal in all circumstances, including religious uses. Smith
I, 485 U.S. at 674. The Oregon Supreme Court held there were no exceptions for religious
uses of peyote. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. The Oregon Supreme Court then determined that
the state's interest in the solvency of its unemployment fund in this instance was not com-
pelling and therefore did not justify the burden that the denial of benefits placed on the
employees' religious practices. Id.
163. Id. at 874-75. Respondents worked for a drug rehabilitation program. Id. at 874.




empted a religious believer from compliance with a valid state pro-
hibition.166 In reviewing its previous decisions, the Court explained
that only when the claim of freedom of religion had been combined
with some other freedom guaranteed under the United States Con-
stitution, had a neutral and generally applicable state law been in-
validated as applied to religious conduct. '67
The Court held that because the state law in question was neu-
tral and generally applicable, did not regulate religious belief, and
did not interfere with any other constitutional freedom, it did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause.168 Further, the Court held that
the state law need not be justified by a compelling interest in order
to deny respondents an exemption from the application of that
law.1
6 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor urged the Court not
to abandon its previous free exercise jurisprudence.1 70 Applying the
Court's pre-Smith free exercise analysis, Justice O'Connor noted
that the statute did burden the free exercise of religion.1 7 She
then indicated that the state had a compelling interest in both
prohibiting the possession and use of peyote and in not exempting
respondents from that prohibition. 7 2 Thus, in Justice O'Connor's
view, the same result could have been reached by employing the
Court's traditional free exercise analysis in this case.
1 3
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun also urged the Court
to apply its traditional free exercise analysis. 17 With regard to the
instant case, Justice Blackmun concluded that the state did not
have a compelling interest that justified refusal to exempt religious
use of peyote from the state prohibition.
75
166. Id. at 878-79.
167. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. The Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (see notes 64-72 and accompanying text), as an example of a case invalidating a state
law because the law impeded both freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Smith, 494
U.S. at 881 n.1. The Court also cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (see notes 130-
138 and accompanying text), asserting that its decision in Yoder was based on the combina-
tion of freedom of religion and the rights of parents. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1.
168. Id. at 882.
169. Id. at 885. The Court opined that if religious exemptions were granted unless the
statute was justified by a compelling state interest, anarchy would soon follow as exemptions
would be sought from virtually every societal obligation. Id. at 888.
170. Id. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 903.
172. Id. at 905.
173. Id. at 907.
174. Smith, 494 U.S. at 909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall joined in Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. at 907.
175. Id. at 921. In holding that the state did not have a compelling interest in prohib-
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In response to the Court's decision in Smith, Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("Act").1 76 The stated pur-
pose of the Act is to require courts to use the pre-Smith compel-
iting the religious use of peyote, Justice Blackmun focused on the absence of prosecutions of
religious users of peyote and on the lack of evidence that anyone had been harmed by such
use. Id. at 911-12.
176. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, provides, in part:
Sec. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSES.
(a) Findings. - The Congress finds that -
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and com-
peting prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guar-
antee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substan-
tially burdened by government.
Sec. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) In General.- Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as pro-
vided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception.-Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the lease restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
(c) Judicial relief.-A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation
of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or
defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing arising
under article III of the Constitution ..
Sec. 6. APPLICABILITY.
(a) In General.-This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementa-
tion of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
the enactment of this Act . . ..
Sec. 7. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address
that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of
religion. . ..
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 197 Stat. 1488 (1993).
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ling interest test in free exercise cases. 177 The findings set forth in
the Act indicate that Congress believed the Smith decision eviscer-
ated the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion. 78
In reviewing the history of the Court's decisions in cases arising
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the evolu-
tion of the Court's analysis is clear. From the earliest cases, the
Court has always maintained that the Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects absolutely an individual's freedom of belief. There does not
appear to be any state interest that would justify any restriction on
belief. However, until the Free Exercise Clause was understood to
protect conduct as well as belief, in practice, its protections were
minimal. 179 Indeed, in light of the protection afforded by virtue of
the other First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press, as
well as the prohibition against the establishment of religion, the
Free Exercise Clause would seem superfluous if it were not in-
tended to protect religious conduct.
From its earliest cases, the Court has also consistently held that
conduct is subject to regulation. Beginning with its decision in
Cantwell v. Connecticut,"8 ' the Court recognized that conduct that
flowed from religious beliefs could be protected under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. Later, the Court developed a cogent analysis for de-
termining whether a statute regulating conduct violated the Free
Exercise Clause. First, the Court would determine whether the
statute imposed a burden on the free exercise of religion. This re-
quired a showing by the religious believer that some statutory re-
quirement or prohibition was contrary to the believer's religious
practices. If the statute imposed a burden on religion, the Court
would then consider whether the statute advanced a compelling
state interest and whether granting exemptions from compliance
with the statute would undermine that compelling interest. By re-
quiring the state to justify a burden on religion with a compelling
interest, the Court demonstrated its commitment to upholding the
First Amendment ban on laws prohibiting the free exercise of
religion.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court abandoned this analysis in Em-
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. For example in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), freedom of belief was insuf-
ficient to protect a member of the Mormon church from being disqualified from voting be-
cause Mormons- believed in and advocated polygamy. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (see notes 59-63
and accompanying text).
180. See notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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ployment Division v. Smith.18 Instead of resolving the issue of
whether the statute imposed a burden on religious conduct and
whether that burden was justified by a compelling interest, the
Court declared that neutral, generally applicable laws were beyond
the reach of the Free Exercise Clause. In announcing this decision,
the Court attempted to explain away and distinguish decades of
free exercise jurisprudence.
The difficulties with the Court's decision in Smith cannot be
fully appreciated in the instant case, Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. Because Lukumi involved that rare
case in which a law was enacted to prohibit the free exercise of
religion, the outcome would likely have been the same under either
the pre-Smith or the Smith analysis. However, the Court's reason-
ing in Lukumi demonstrates the narrowing of the Court's focus in
cases invoking the Free Exercise Clause.
Under the pre-Smith analysis, the Court first would have deter-
mined that the City's ordinances imposed a burden on the free ex-
ercise of the Church's religion. Then, the Court would have ex-
amined whether there was a compelling state interest to justify the
ordinances and to justify the refusal to exempt the Church from
compliance with the ordinances. Certainly, the number of exemp-
tions included in the ordinances ' would have been a sufficient ba-
sis to determine that the City did not have a compelling interest in
refusing to grant the Church an exemption. Therefore, using the
pre-Smith analysis, the Court would likely have concluded that the
ordinances violated the Free Exercise Clause.
This conclusion was also reached in Lukumi by using the stan-
dard set forth in Smith. The Court discussed at length the issue of
whether the ordinances were neutral and generally applicable.
Finding the ordinances to be neither, the Court then examined
whether they were justified by a compelling governmental interest.
In this part of the analysis the rest of the Smith "test" is revealed:
if a law is not neutral and generally applicable, it will not be justi-
fied by a compelling interest, because compelling interests are neu-
tral and generally applicable.18 3 Therefore, the Smith test, as ex-
plained and applied by the Court in Lukumi, is a mere
pronouncement that neutral and generally applicable laws will be
upheld and those that are not neutral and generally applicable will
181. See notes 161-175 and accompanying text.
182. See note 35 for a list of exemptions.




In Lukumi, the Court was compelled to reach the conclusion
that there was no interest sufficient to justify the ordinances by
virtue of the Court's determination that the ordinances were en-
acted to suppress religion, out of hostility to the religion's follow-
ers, and that the ordinances targeted religious practices and pro-
hibited more conduct than necessary to achieve their goals.' 8'
However, as Justice Souter noted in his concurring opinion, the
Court's typical cases involving the Free Exercise Clause concern
neutral and generally applicable laws, rather than laws designed to
prohibit religious practices.' 85
Thus, while the application of Smith to this case did not appear
to affect the result, the same may not hold true in future cases
where seemingly neutral and generally applicable laws impose seri-
ous burdens on the free exercise of religion. Under Smith, the se-
verity of the burden and the interest of the state are irrelevant,
provided the law satisfies neutrality and general applicability.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act' ("Act") attempts to
reinstate pre-Smith jurisprudence; however, the Act may exceed
the scope of congressional legislative power. The Act attempts to
impose an interpretation of the United States Constitution on the
courts. From the time of Marbury v. Madison,8 7 it has been a set-
tled principle that the Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on
the meaning of the United States Constitution. Thus, any congres-
sional intrusion into the Court's sphere must have constitutional
justification.
Arguably, such justification might lie in congressional power to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 88 In Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 89 the Supreme Court held that Congress had
broad power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to en-
force the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 " The ques-
tion before the Court was whether Congress could prohibit the en-
184. Id. at 2231.
185. Id. at 2243 (Souter, J., concurring).
186. See notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
i87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
188. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[tihe Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
189. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
190. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650. At issue in Katzenbach was a provision of the Vot-




forcement of state laws even if the Court did not find those laws to
be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 9' The Court held that congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is akin to the Article I
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause and is, therefore,
very broad.'92
While there appears to be a common justification for congres-
sional power to enact legislation to ensure equal protection and
free exercise of religion, there are significant differences. Both the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment are enforceable
against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment; the
Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Supreme Court has held that First Amendment protec-
tions apply to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, while the Voting Rights Act
would flow directly from Congress' ability to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act purports
to alter the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment through Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Such congressional legislation is unprecedented.
If the Act does exceed Congress' legislative authority, Smith will
remain the standard by which cases invoking the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment will be decided. Sadly, that stan-
dard provides precious little protection for individuals whose reli-
gious conduct is burdened by neutral governmental enactments. In
the wake of Smith, the only statutes that will be struck down are
those which, like the ordinances in Lukumi, target religious prac-
tices. Lukumi demonstrates the Supreme Court's limited view of
the scope of the Free Exercise Clause-if the ordinances in ques-
tion had been written in a more neutral and generally applicable
fashion, the fact that the ordinances outlawed the central religious
practice of the Church would have been of no moment.
Kimberly A. Taylor
191. Id. at 649. See note 26 for the text of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
192. Id. at 650.
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